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A BRIGHTER DAY FOR THE MAGIC LANTERN:
THOUGHTS ON THE IMPACT OF THE NEW
COPYRIGHT ACT ON MOTION PICTURESt
by Peter F. Nolan*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a certain benign innocence in the Egyptian-copyright law's
reference to a motion picture projector as a "magic lantern."' Unfortu-
nately, prior to passage of the Copyright Revision Act in 1976,2 the
copyright law in the United States reflected in many respects that same
attitude toward motion pictures. Under the Copyright Act of 19093
motion pictures were enumerated as protectible only as an afterthought. 4
Few references were made in the 1909 Act to motion pictures, and the
uncertainties that resulted when proprietors sought to protect their motion
pictures were many. The situation was aggravated by technological
advances in the motion picture field and other problems not foreseen in
the early 1900's. The statute obviously did not expressly deal with sound
tracks, broadcast television, community antenna television, videotape,
videodisc, or tape and film piracy. The courts and the Copyright Office
were nevertheless asked over the years to interpret the 1909 law as if that
statute did cover those new areas of concern.
The United States now has a new federal copyright statute that does
resolve (for better or worse) many of the issues about which there was
doubt under the prior law. Moreover, it has changed the law in some
instances, for the most part in favor of motion picture proprietors and, in
some cases, has created its own quagmire of issues to confound and
confuse the practitioner. This article will generally discuss and interpret
t Copyright @ 1978 Peter F. Nolan.
* A.B., 1965 (Georgetown University); J.D., 1968 (Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter). The author is an attorney for Walt Disney Productions, Burbank, California.
1. Law Relating to the Protection of Copyright (No. 354), June 24, 1954, art. 6(i),
Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, United Arab Republic, Item 1.
2. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (to be
codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Act].
3. Copyright Act, ch. 320, §§ 1-62, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§
1-216 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)) [the current version is hereinafter cited as 1909 Act].
4. 1909 Act § 5(/)-(m).
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the new statute, in conjunction with its extensive legislative history, so
that attorneys who might have to advise those involved with the motion
picture industry may have at least a starting point for understanding the
1976 Act and the impact it has on his or her client's business.
II. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF MOTION PICTURES
As alluded to above, motion pictures were not expressly protected
under federal copyright law until adoption of the 1912 Townsend
Amendment,' three years after the previous copyright statute was enact-
ed. Prior to that time motion pictures were protected, but only because
the courts were willing to interpret the category "photographs" broadly. 6
Section 5 of the 1909 Act, as changed by the Townsend Amendment in
1912, distinguished between two types of motion pictures: motion pic-
ture photoplays (Class L)7 and motion pictures other than photoplays
(Class M).8 Motion picture photoplays came to be regarded as motion
pictures containing a story or plot,9 while all other motion pictures such
as travelogues and most television commercials, were classified in ClassM. lo0
Although both types of motion pictures were copyrightable under the
amended 1909 Act, the basis of protection available for each was differ-
ent."1 In the 1976 Act there is no distinction made between types of
motion pictures: all motion pictures, except perhaps taped television
news shows, 12 are treated essentially the same. Significantly, motion
pictures are for the first time expressly defined in a federal copyright
statute, the 1976 Act providing: " 'Motion pictures' are audio visual works
consisting of a series of related images which, when shown in succes-
sion, impart an impression of motion, together with accompanying
sounds, if any." 13 Finally, it must be remembered that motion pictures
5. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970))
[hereinafter cited as Townsend Amendment].
6. Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1903); American Mutoscope & Biograph
Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 F. 262, 266 (C.C.D.N.J. 1905).
7. 1909 Act § 5(1) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 5(/) (1970)).
8. Id. § 5(m) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 5(m) (1970)).
9. 37 C.F.R. § 202.15(a) (1977); COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §
2.14.1.III(a)(1) (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM]; see, e.g., Rohauer v. Killiam
Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 484 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
10. 37 C.F.R. § 202.15(b) (1977); COMPENDIUM, supra note 9, § 2.14.1.II(a)(2).
11. See text accompanying notes 113-18 infra.
12. See text accompanying note 156 infra.
13. 1976 Act § 101. Motion pictures also remain a specifically enumerated category of
subject matter protectible under the federal copyright statute. Id. § 102(a)(6).
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under the 1976 Act are a specie of the broader category of "audiovisual
works," 14 which (as will be seen) is a matter of importance for a number
of reasons. 15
A. Videotapes
The Copyright Office had for a number of years registered copyright
claims for motion pictures embodied only in the form of videotapes, 1
6
and at least one court had held that works on videotapes were copyright-
able. 17
The definition of "audiovisual works" in the 1976 Act'8 confirms that
motion pictures need not be embodied on copies that are perceptible to
the mere naked eye in order to be protected. Such works are required
only to be "intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or
devices."' 9 The definition specifically declares that audiovisual works
may be embodied and are protectible in materials such as tapes and
videodiscs.
20
A constitutional challenge on this issue will undoubtedly be made on
the ground that a work only embodied in a copy that cannot be visually
perceived without the aid of a machine is not a "writing," within the
meaning of that word in the copyright clause of the United States
14. Id. § 101. See also H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as 1967 House Report] which declared that the definition of audiovisual works under
the proposed 1967 legislation encompassed the smaller class motion pictures.
15. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 135, 148, 156-57 infra.
16. 37 C.F.R. § 202.15(d) (1977); see COMPENDIUM, supra note 9, § 2.14.1.II(c).
17. Trophy Prods., Inc. v. Telebrity, Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 830 (N.Y. 1975). See
Walt Disney Prods. v. Alaska Television Network, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash.
1969).
18. "Audiovisual works" are defined as
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be
shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
1976 Act § 101.
19. Id.
20. Id. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
1976 House Report]; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 54 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
1975 Senate Report]. Section 102(a) of the 1976 Act, which sets forth the general criteria
for the subject matter covered by the Act, requires inter alia that in order to be copyright-
able works must be fixed "in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 1976 Act § 102(a). See also
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 6, at 5 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHT
LAw REVISION Pt. 6].
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Constitution.2 Such an argument should, however, fail for reasons
similar to the unsuccessful attack on the constitutionality of the amend-
ment to the 1909 Act granting antidubbing protection for performances
on certain sound recordings.22
B. Sound Tracks
When the 1909 Act was amended in 1912 by adding motion pictures to
section 5, there were no sound motion pictures in existence and no need
to provide for their copyrightabiity. 23 It was not until the 1971 amend-
ment24 that Congress specified that motion picture sound tracks were
within the ambit of section 5. Under the new law the sound track is by
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, permits Congress to enact copyright legislation only
for the "writings" of an author. Writings have been defined by the Supreme Court to
include all forms of "writing, printing, engraving, etching, etc. by which the ideas in the
mind of the author are given visible expression." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, Il1 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). For an excellent presentation of the historical background
and interpretive development of the word "writings" in the Constitution, see W. DEREN-
BERG, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY PURSUANT TO
S. RES. 53 THE MEANING OF "WRITINGS" IN THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITU-
TION-STUDY No. 3 (Comm. Print 1960), one of the original studies prepared in the early
stages in the latest effort to revise the United States copyrigbt law.
22. Shaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589 (D.D.C. 1972). The primary support for
such an attack would probably be White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1,
18 (1908), which held that a material object not perceptible to the naked eye was not a
"copy." The defendant in White-Smith was not, however, challenging the copyrightabil-
ity of the plaintiff's two musical compositions. Rather, the defendant contended that
perforated musical sheets were not tangible embodiments of the intellectual product
which constituted the musical composition within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 7. In
the author's opinion, reliance on the White-Smith decision would also be misplaced
because there the Supreme Court was concerned only with interpreting language in a prior
statute. Id. at 15. Moreover, both houses of Congress have, in adopting the 1976 Act,
categorically repudiated the reasoning in White-Smith to the extent it might be applicable
to the constitutional question of what constitutes copyrightable subject matter. 1976
House Report, supra note 20, at 52; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 51.
23. This problem was manifested by a spate of litigation over whether a grant of motion
picture rights made during the era of silent movies included sound motion picture rights.
See, e.g., Murphy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 112 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1940); Page & Co.
v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1936).
24. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1(f), 85 Stat. 391.
25. The House Report on the 1971 amendment stated:
This legislation extends copyright protection to sound recordings which . . . reflects
the Committee's opinion that soundtracks or audio tracks are an integral part of the
"motion pictures" already accorded protection under subsections (I) and (m) of
Section 1 [sic] of title 17, and that the reproduction of the sound accompanying a
copyrighted motion picture is an infringement of copyright in the motion picture.
H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1566, 1570-71; S. REP. No. 72, 92d Cong., lst Sess. 5 (1971). Prior to the enactment
of this statute, the Copyright Office took the position that performances or other works
embodied on a motion picture sound track.were not a copyrightable element of a motion
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definition a copyrightable part of a motion picture.26
However, an important distinction is made in the 1976 Act between a
"sound track" and a "sound recording." The definition of the latter
specifically excludes from its scope "sound accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual works." 27 The significance of this statutory
distinction is that the protection granted sound recordings is essentially
limited to unauthorized dubbing.28 Protected sound tracks, on the other
hand, may not be reproduced without permission, nor may they be
imitated or publicly performed absent the consent of the copyright
owner.
29
Although a sound track is not specifically defined in the Act, the
exclusionary language used in defining sound recordings supports a
rather clear inference that a sound track is a work of sound that accom-
panies a motion picture.30 Applying this implied definition of a sound
track to motion picture industry practices is not, however, an easy task.
More often than not, a producer will make a recording of a work of sound
for the purpose of accompanying a motion picture, but will first release it
on a phonorecord to promote the motion picture. Does the format of the
first release determine whether the work of sound is a sound track or a
sound recording? It is submitted that it does not. The point in time the
work of sound is created determines whether it is a sound recording or a
sound track.31 The primary intention of the producer appears to be the
picture. It would refuse to register a copyright claim to a sound track if that was the sole
new matter in a deposited motion picture. COMPENDIUM, supra note 9, § 2.14.1.III(b).
Interestingly, at the same time the Copyright Office disclaimed taking a position on
whether a sound track was copyrightable. Id. § 2.14.1.111(a). That asserted position, of
course, changed. 37 C.F.R. § 202.15a(c) (1977). Very few courts even discussed the issue.
See Trophy Prods., Inc. v. Telebrity, Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 830, 831-32 (N.Y. 1975);
Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 137, 142 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949) (common law
copyright protection denied due to publication of motion picture incorporating sound
track). See also Brylawski, Copyrightability of Motion Picture Sound Tracks, 18 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 357 (1971).
26. The definition of "motion pictures" in § 101 includes the phrase "together with
accompanying sounds, if any." 1976 Act § 101. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 56;
1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 54.
27. 1976 Act § 101.
28. Id. § 114(b).
29. Id. § 106.
30. Sound recordings are defined in § 101 as
works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but
not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other
phonorecords, in which they are embodied.
Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
31. Id. §§ 301(a), 302(a); see 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 129-36; 1975 Senate
Report, supra note 20, at 112-19.
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critically important factor.3 2 Such intent is evidenced by whether or not
there is an application of (or a manifest intention to apply)33 the work of
sound to a motion picture during the movie's preparation.
34
Can a sound track ever become a sound recording or, conversely, can a
sound recording ever become a sound track? Examination of the 1976
Act legislative history provides little insight to this question, but what
seems to be the most logical approach (if for no other reason than to
avoid confusion) is to consider a work as always in one category or the
other. Adopting such a view will ensure that a work will never lose the
designated categorical rights while simultaneously precluding the advan-
tages of the other type of work.
Logic has never impeded legislation before and it appears that Con-
gress did not break with that tradition by being consistent on this point.
Both the House and Senate Committee Reports state that once a sound
track is embodied in a phonorecord an unauthorized public performance
of that phonorecord will not constitute an infringement of the sound track
copyright. Nonetheless an owner may apparently stop the public per-
formance of his sound track, if the performance takes place as the result
of playing a copy (rather than a phonorecord) of the sound track. 35
32. According to § 101, a "work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord
for the first time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has
been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time. . . ." 1976 Act §
101. If applied literally, a work of sound could virtually never be a "sound track," only a
"sound recording." This is because a sound track is in almost all cases first fixed on a
master (a "phonorecord" under § 101 of the 1976 Act). The intended primary use of the
work of sound at the time of creation is, therefore, the critical factor.
33. The producer's intention may often be determined by such factors as whether he
utilizes the services of musicians under a motion picture collective bargaining agreement
or a sound recording collective bargaining agreement.
34. Quite frequently, an "original sound track album" will contain substantial new
matter which can be the basis for a separate copyright. See H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 5, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1566, 1570; S. REP. No. 72,
92d Cong., I st Sess. 5 (1971). Such a sound recording copyright in the new matter will not,
however, affect the status of the copyright in a pre-existing sound track. 1976 Act § 103.
35. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 64; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 60.
Of course, as a practical matter, the owner of a sound track may wish to encourage its
public performance. This because, assuming the producer or an affiliated company owns
the public performance rights to music in the performed sound track, royalties from
performing rights societies would be payable upon the public performance of that music.
Moreover, such performances might promote the viewing of the motion picture of which
the sound track was an integral part. It should be noted that § 114 of the 1976 Act sets forth
a number of limitations on the scope of sound recording rights. It is not yet clear whether
sound tracks embodied in a phonorecord will be subject to the provisions of § 114. See
text accompanying note 28 supra.
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C. Live Performances
The 1976 Act does not cover mere live performances, such as telecasts
of live sports events, leaving protection for such works to the common
law. If, however, such a performance is simultaneously "fixed," or
embodied in at least one copy, the new law does protect the work,
generally as a "motion picture.' '36
III. NECESSARY FORMALITIES
A. Publication
Under the 1909 Act copyright protection for motion pictures was
secured in one of two ways: registration for a motion picture in unpub-
lished form37 or by publication of the motion picture with an appropriate
notice of copyright. 38 Most motion picture producers attempted to secure
copyright protection for their work through the second method by assert-
ing their work had been published with notice, and therefore it became
important to determine when a motion picture was published under the
prior statute. However, uncertainty prevailed in the absence of a clear
judicial standard.
39
Because the new statute now protects motion pictures from the mo-
ment of creation, 4° one would have thought the concept of motion picture
"publication" would be of interest only to legal historians. To the
contrary, when a new motion picture is first published under the 1976
Act, it will still be an important question4' and, unfortunately, one that
36. 1976 Act § 102(a); 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 52; 1975 Senate Report,
supra note 20, at 51. For a detailed explanation of congressional intent with regard to such
performances see 1967 House Report, supra note 14, at 15-16.
37. 1909 Act § 12. E.g., Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1938).
38. 1909 Act § 13. E.g., Stern v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 175 F. 282, 284 (S.D.N.Y.
1910).
39. See Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 655 (1938); Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 137 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949); Brandon
Films, Inc. v. Arjay Enterprises, Inc., 230 N.Y.S.2d 56 (N.Y. 1962); O'Neill v. General
Film Co., 157 N.Y.S. 1028 (N.Y. 1916). See Nolan, Copyright Protection for Motion
Pictures: Limited or Perpetual?, 18 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 174 (1970). The distribu-
tion of copies of motion pictures to theaters, networks, or individual television stations
was considered by the Copyright Office to constitute at least an investitive publication
under the 1909 Act. COMPENDIUM, supra note 9, § 3.1.1.III(d) (Example 1).
40. 1976 Act §§ 301(a), 302(a).
41. Publication is significant for a number of reasons. For example: (1) the term of
protection for a work will often depend upon whether or not it has been published, id. §§
302(p), 303-304(b); (2) the notice provisions apply only to published works, id. § 401(a); (3)
deposit must be made for works published in the United States, id. § 407(a); (4) statutory
damages and attorneys' fees in certain infringement cases may be barred, depending upon
whether the infringed motion picture is published or unpublished, id. § 412.
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the statute in certain circumstances tends to make difficult to resolve. On
the positive side, the 1976 Act ensures that at least initial copyright
protection will be unaffected by publication.42
The 1976 Act defines "'publication" as
the distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The
offering to distribute copies. . . to a group of persons for.purposes
of further distribution, public performance, or public display, consti-
tutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does
not of itself constitute publication.
43
Each sentence of the definition has significance and must be analyzed
separately. Consistent with both case law44 and a reference in the legisla-
tive history4' of the 1909 Act, Congress has made plain in the last
sentence of the definition of publication that the mere public screening of
a motion picture, whether in a theater or on television, does not constitute
a publication of a motion picture.46 At the other end of the distribution
spectrum, the mere making of a copy or copies of a motion picture is not
a publication.4'
The first sentence of the definition clearly provides that the sale, rental
or lease of one4 or more copies of a motion picture to the public
42. Under the 1909 Act protection for works such as stories in manuscript form,
periodicals and maps, could not be secured unless the works were first published. 37
C.F.R. § 202.4-.5 (1977). The new statute eliminates that necessity. 1976 Act § 301(a).
43. 1976 Act § 101.
44. King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101, 105-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. v. Wyatt, 21 Copy. DEC. 203, 205-06 (D. Md. 1932); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 248"N.Y.S.2d 809, 812-13
(N.Y. 1964) (dictum); DeMille Co. v. Casey, 209 N.Y.S. 20, 28 (N.Y. 1923); accord,
Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912).
45. In granting initial protection under the 1909 Act to "unpublished" dramatic works,
the 60th Congress assumed that the mere performance was not a publication of such a
work. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. S4 (1909), reprinted in F. BRYLAWSKI &
A. GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT, at S4 (1976).
46. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 138; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
121.
47. The first two sentences of the statutory definition refer only to actual distribution of
copies or an "offering to distribute copies," not to the mere making of copies. 1976 Act §
101.
48. Even though the first sentence, of the publication definition refers to the plural
"copies," the legislative history indicates that distribution of only one copy could consti-
tute a publication. Both the House and Senate Reports contain the following sentence:
"Under the definition in section 101, a work is 'published' if one or more copies. . . are
distributed to the public. . . ." 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 138; 1975 Senate
Report, supra note 20, at 121 (emphasis added). Also, in discussing § 106, both Reports
state that "[tihe references to 'copies or phonorecords,' although in the plural, are
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constitutes a publication. Application of this sentence of the definition to
motion picture distribution practices does, however, present serious
problems, due to the ambiguity in the word "public." Is, for instance,
the distribution of copies to motion picture theaters, networks, or indi-
vidual television stations a distribution to the public? The legislative
history of the 1976 Act does not supply a ready answer. The House and
Senate Reports refer to the public as "generally . . . persons under no
explicit or implicit restrictions with respect to disclosure of [a particular
work's] contents . . . . I Since motion picture theaters, networks, and
individual television stations are virtually always restricted as to "disclo-
sure"-when and how they can exhibit a distributed copy of a motion
picture-they might well not be deemed a part of the public within the
meaning of the publication definition.5"
The offering to distribute copies of a motion picture to theaters or
individual television stations would constitute a "publication" under the
second sentence of the definition.5' An offer to distribute such copies of a
intended here and throughout the bill to include the singular (I U.S.C. § 1)." 1976 House
Report, supra note 20, at 61; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 58 (emphasis added). I
U.S.C. § 1, referred to in the Reports, reads in pertinent part: "In determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . words
importing the plural include the singular .... "
49. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 138; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 91.
At an early stage of the legislative process publication included the requirement of
distribution of copies to the "public at large." STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 3, at 18 n.14 (Comm. Print 1964)
[hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 3]. The words "at large" were deleted
in subsequent drafts of the revision bill, possibly in part because works such as motion
pictures might never be published under that proposed definition. STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 4, at 23
(Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 4].
50. One could also urge that virtually all persons who have sold, rented or leased a copy
of a motion picture are restricted as to its disclosure in some manner and would not be
considered part of the public. For example, super 8mm prints containing excerpts of
motion pictures are normally licensed only for private performances. Additionally, the use
of copies of motion pictures rented or leased to non-theatrical users are generally restrict-
ed as to time and place of utilization. However, Congress undoubtedly intended at least
some renters of motion pictures to be considered part of the public in the definition, since
the first sentence refers to distribution by "rental, lease, or lending." The issue is
probably academic since offers of such sales, rentals and leases usually are made to
groups of persons, and would therefore constitute a publication under the second sen-
tence of § 101.
51. The rationale behind the addition of the second sentence: "The offering to distri-
bute copies . . . to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public
performance, or public display, constitutes publication," of § 101 in 1971 is not revealed in
scrutiny of the 1971 legislative history. See S. 644, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 101 (1971) in
which the new language was added. Although the committee reports do not expressly
address the issue, both the first and the second sentence of the definition of publication
seem to presuppose the existence of copies to distribute. Presumably, the work must be
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motion picture to a single network, however, might not constitute a
publication, since the statute requires that the offer be made to a group of
persons rather than to a single person. It is equally unclear whether an
offer to distribute copies to all three networks is a publication.
52
Vagueness in the phrase "offering to distribute" copies in the second
sentence creates further difficulties. Normally, the motion picture begins
with the distributor sending invitations for offers by theatrical exhibitors
to perform the film publicly during a certain time period. The exhibitors
then submit such offers to the distributors, some of which are accepted
and many rejected. Copies of the motion picture are later actually
distributed to those exhibitors whose offers were accepted. Where in this
process is there an "offering to distribute" copies? Technically, the first
step is not an offer at all, at least not in the contract sense, rather it is no
more than an invitation. Moreover, the theaters' responses are offers to
exhibit, not offers to distribute copies. And the final step is not an offer,
but an acceptance of the theaters' offer to exhibit.
At the time of this writing, the Copyright Office has not issued
regulations on the subject of publication; hopefully, if regulations are
issued, they will shed some light on this troublesome area.
B. Deposit Requirements
While the new law relaxes many of the old requirements, it nonethe-
less places on a copyright proprietor the obligation to deposit with the
Copyright Office (for use by the Library of Congress) 5 3 two "best
edition" copies54 of motion pictures that have been published with notice
fixed in at least one copy before a publication of that work can occur, that is, there cannot
be a publication of a work of which there are only "unborn" copies. It is also unlikely that
a court will relate the time of publication back to the time an offer to distribute unborn
copies of a work was made to when the copies are produced.
52. Indeed, Congress has apparently assumed that motion pictures offered to television
networks are not published. The House Report in explaining the right of the Library of
Congress under certain circumstances to reproduce unpublished motion pictures under §
407(e), stated: "These amendments are intended to provide a basis for the Library of
Congress to acquire, as a part of the copyright deposit system, copies or recordings of
non-syndicated. . . television programs, without imposing any hardships on broadcast-
ers." 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 152 (emphasis added). Similar language
appeared in the Conference Committee Report with respect to the adoption of § 407(e).
H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Conference
Report]. It is arguable that an offer to distribute copies to a single television network
constitutes a publication, but in light of the language in the aforementioned House and
Conference Reports, it would appear that such an argument may well be unavailing.
53. 1976 Act § 407(b).
54. "Copies" includes film prints, videotapes and videodiscs. Id. § 101. The "best
edition" of a work is that which the Library of Congress determines is most suitable for its
purposes. Id. At this writing the Copyright Office has promulgated only proposed regula-
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of copyright in the United States.55 The proprietor has three months from
publication of the motion picture to effectuate the deposit.56 However,
motion pictures published only outside the United States or motion
pictures published in the United States without notice of copyright are
exempt from, the deposit requirements. Further, copies of unpublished
motion pictures need not be deposited.57 Fines, rather than forfeiture of
copyright, are the only penalties for failure to make the required de-
posit.
58
In recognition of the substantial expense connected with depositing
copies of motion pictures, Congress adopted a provision in the 1976 Act
which allows, but does not require, the Register of Copyrights to issue
regulations exempting works such as motion pictures from the require-
ment that two copies of the work be deposited. 59 Although the Register
has not yet issued final regulations on this point, it is expected that the
authority will be exercised and the regulations will exempt from deposit
one of the two motion picture copies required by section 407(a). 60
C. Registration
Registration of copyright claims to published motion pictures, while
not strictly required, is important to obtain under the 1976 Act. 61 There
are a number of incentives for prompt registration for both published and
unpublished motion pictures, the most significant of which is the possi-
bility of obtaining statutory damages and attorneys' fees in a copyright
infringement action. Unless registration precedes the occurrence of an
infringement, statutory damages and attorneys' fees in an infringement
tions on what constitutes the best edition of a motion picture. 42 Fed. Reg. 59,306 (1977)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(b)(1)(i)).
55. 1976 Act § 407(a).
56. Id.
57. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 151; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
134. It should be noted that Congress has authorized the Library of Congress to tape off
the air and retain one copy of unpublished motion pictures transmitted (i.e,, televised) to
the public in the United States or to demand the deposit of such a copy for the Library's
archives. This right is, however, subject to a number of conditions. 1976 Act § 407(e); 1976
House Report, supra note 20, at 152.
58. 1976 Act § 407(d).
59. Id. § 407(c).
60. Under proposed regulations the Copyright Office would require the deposit of only
one copy of a motion picture. 42 Fed. Reg. 59,306 (1977) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §
202.19(d)(2)(ii)).
61. 1976 Act § 408(a). Registration is a condition to copyright protection only if a large
quantity of copies of a published work are publicly distributed without a copyright notice
and registration for the work has not been made within five years after the omission
occurred. Id. § 405(a).
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action will not be awarded.62 There is, however, some flexibility in this
otherwise harsh limitation, as the copyright owner of a published motion
picture is granted a grace period of three months from the date of initial
publication in which to register a copyright claim to his work. 63 Unfortu-
nately, no such grace period is provided for unpublished motion pictures.
It is therefore imperative that registration for such works be made as
promptly as possible after fixation if there is a substantial risk that the
work will be infringed before it is published.' 4
In addition to the deposit requirements of section 407,65 the 1976 Act
also mandates the deposit of copies in order to avail oneself of registra-
tion. Importantly, the copies required to be deposited under the registra-
tion provisions are supplemental to and not inclusive of the general
deposit requirements. 66 In the case of published motion pictures, two
complete copies of the best edition are to be deposited. For unpublished
motion pictures, only one copy need be deposited. 67 Section 408(c) of the
Act does provide that the Register of Copyrights, at her discretion, may
issue regulations that would permit limiting the registration deposit to one
copy or identifying materials in lieu of copies. 68 The Register has not, at
the time of this writing, fully exercised that regulatory authority.
69
At first blush it would appear that there is some incentive to contend a
particular motion picture is "unpublished," since both the registration
and deposit requirements for such works appear less burdensome. It
should be noted, however, that section 407(e) grants options to the
Library of Congress to tape a copy of unpublished motion pictures
televised in the United States off the air for its archives, to demand a
copy of the movie, or to demand certain payments relating to the
unpublished motion picture.70 This potential demand on proprietors may,
at least for televised motion pictures, outweigh the supposed advantage
of avoiding the more stringent registration and deposit requirements for
62. Id. § 412.
63. Id. § 412(2); 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 153; 1975 Senate Report, supra
note 20, at 140.
64. For example, there have been a few instances where unauthorized prints of a
motion picture have been offered for sale in the piracy market, even before the theatrical
distribution of the picture has taken place. If the infringement occurs prior to registration
for such unpublished works, statutory damages and attorneys' fees would be unavailable.
65. See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text.
66. But see text accompanying notes 74-75 infra.
67. 1976 Act § 408(b).
68. Id. § 408(c).
69. Proposed regulations allow the deposit of only one copy of a motion picture for
registration. 42 Fed. Reg. 59,308 (1977) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(ii)).
70. 1976 Act § 407(e).
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unpublished works. A saving grace may be that the Library's exercise of
its section 407(e) option by taping an unpublished motion picture off the
air, may result in that copy being utilized to satisfy the registration
deposit requirement.7
Contrary to provisions of the 1909 Act,72 the new law does not require
the re-registration and further deposit of copies where there is a pub-
lication of a work for which registration had been made when it was
unpublished.73
The deposit for works under section 407 may be used to satisfy the
section 408 deposit requirements, provided the section 407 deposit is
accompanied by the prescribed application, fee, and other required mate-
rials.74 The Register has indicated that she plans to enforce this provision
rather strictly, 75 and it will behoove the claimant to make sure the
required documents accompany every deposit intended to be made under
section 408. Otherwise, the Copyright Office will deem the deposit to be
made under section 407, requiring a further, and additionally expensive,
deposit under section 408.
Under the 1909 Act the Copyright Office issued regulations allowing
separate copyright registration for a work incorporated in a motion
picture, such as original music, only if: (1) registration for the incor-
porated work was accomplished prior to publication of the motion pic-
ture; or (2) a separate copyright notice for the incorporated work was
present on published prints of the motion picture. 6 This regulation, while
prospective in application, did cast some doubt on the validity of copy-
right registrations made prior to the issuance of the regulation. Further, it
caused at least some producers to change their practices to ensure that
copyright registration for music embodied in sound tracks occurred prior
to the publication of the motion picture. This separate registrability
problem is now moot, since the new Act provides that registration for a
71. Id. § 408(b). The Register need not issue regulations which would allow use of a §
407(e) copy as a registration deposit if the copy was obtained pursuant to subsection (2) of
that section. Section 407(e)(2) provides that such regulations shall set standards and
procedures by which the Register may make written demand upon the owner of the right
of transmission in the United States for the deposit of a copy of a specific transmission
program.
72. 1909 Act § 12.
73. 1976 Act § 408(e).
74. Id. § 408(b).
75. Announcement from the Copyright Office, No. ML-152 (May, 1977). The Register
may eventually allow a § 407 deposit to be used for registration purposes if the § 407
deposit is accompanied by at least a letter stating that the application for registration will
be forthcoming. 42 Fed. Reg. 59,307 (1977) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(f)(I)(ii)).
76. 37 C.F.R. § 202.15(e) (1977).
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published work may be made even though copies of the work were
publicly distributed without a separate copyright notice.
77
The practice of registering a copyright claim in music prior to its
publication in a motion picture still appears to be the most prudent course
to follow, since the copyright owner of the music might otherwise be in
the position of having to place a separate music copyright notice on the
copies of a published motion picture embodying the music. If such a
notice were not placed on the published copies, the copyright on the
music could well be jeopardized even though registration for the music
had been made on the basis of motion picture publication.
78
D. Notice of Copyright
There must be a copyright notice on all publicly distributed copies of a
motion picture published in the United States or in any other country.
79
Nonetheless, some copies of published motion pictures need not carry
copyright notices under the 1976 Act. Section 401(a) requires that only
"publicly distributed copies" of published works carry a copyright
notice. Unfortunately, there is no definition of the phrase "publicly
distributed," but presumably it will take on the meaning of its ordinary
usage. The phrase is certainly narrower than the concept of publication in
the Act.80
The normal distribution practices of the motion picture industry do not
ordinarily, at least initially, permit copies of theatrical and television
motion pictures to be distributed to the public. Copies are usually dis-
tributed only to individual motion picture theaters, television networks,
or individual stations. Only after such initial exploitation will copies of
motion pictures generally become available to the public through direct
rentals. A question arises as to whether or not it is only at this second
77. 1976 Act § 405(a)(2). Even the intentional omission of a separate notice will not
preclude registration. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 6, supra note 20, at 105. This was a
change from the earlier view that only inadvertent omission of a copyright notice would
not invalidate a copyright. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 4, supra note 49, at 74.
78. Although registration for a work may be made despite the fact that copies of the
motion picture have been publicly distributed without a copyright notice, the copyright
owner is under an obligation once he discovers the notice omission to make a reasonable
effort to add the notice to all copies publicly distributed in the United States. 1976 Act §
405(a)(2).'
79. Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946) (the proposition that the
notice requirements extend only to copies published in the United States has been
overruled).
80. "Publication," as defined in § 101, includes "offering to distribute," a concept
which is not limited to actual distribution of copies. See text accompanying notes 37-52
supra.
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level of distribution that prints need carry a copyright notice. 81 Since the
legislative history provides little help on the issue, the answer is neces-
sarily speculative. The prudent producer, in the author's opinion, should
save such rather academic argument for those cases where a copyright
notice has not been affixed and an infringer raises the issue. It would, of
course, be the better practice to affix a copyright notice on all copies that
are to be distributed for exploitation purposes.
The notice requirements have in most respects been substantially
relaxed under the new copyright statute. 2 Nonetheless, there are excep-
tions, one of which involves motion pictures. Under the 1909 law the
year date of first publication did not have to be present in the copyright
notices for motion pictures other than photoplays (Class M).83 Under the
1976 Act, however, the copyright notice requirements are more encom-
passing, necessitating use of a year date on copyright notices for all
motion pictures, plus the name of the copyright owner and the word
"Copyright," the abbreviation "Copr.," or the symbol ,©.,84
At the present time it is unclear where the copyright notice must be
located in order to comply with the new statute. The statutory standard
for the location is one of "reasonableness." 85 The legislative history of
section 401 does indicate that the notice need not be located on the print
in such a fashion that it be visible when exhibited or televised. 86 Presum-
ably, it is possible to place the notice on a leader to a copy of a motion
picture rather than placing it in the motion picture itself. The Copyright
Office is required to issue regulations on the manner in which the notice
81. Before the second sentence was added to the publication definition, it was assumed
that "publicly distributed" copies were synonymous with "published" copies. COPY-
RIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 4, supra note 49, at 67. It is only in the context of the broader
language of the second sentence of the definition (in which the word "public" is missing)
that the committee reports discuss theatrical and syndication distribution of motion
picture copies, which would seem to support the contention that such distribution is not to
the public and that a copyright notice need not be present on copies so distributed. 1976
House Report, supra note 20, at 138; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at f21. See notes
51-52 supra and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 143; 1975 Senate Report, supra note
20, at 126.
83. Section 19 of the 1909 Act required the year date of first publication only if the work
involved was a "printed literary, musical, or dramatic work." The Copyright Office
would register copyright claims to Class M (non-photoplay) motion pictures, 37 C.F.R. §
202.15(b) (1977), even though the copyright notice on such works contained no year date.
COMPENDIUM, supra note 9, § 2.14.2.11(a)(2). See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra for
a discussion of Class M and Class L works.
84. 1976 Act § 401(b).
85. Id. § 401(c).
86. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 143; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
126.
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may appear and on the location of copyright notices,87 and such regula-
tions are to be considered conclusively correct.88 On the other hand, the
locations set forth in the regulations are not to be considered exhaus-
tive. 89 At the time of this writing, final regulations on notice location
have not been issued, but may eventually be helpful on this issue.
A copyright notice must also be present on videotapes and videodiscs
containing motion pictures that are publicly distributed. The language in
section 401 of the new statute requires that the notice be present on
copies of a work, including those that are incapable of perception by the
naked eye without the use of a machine.90 It is uncertain whether the
notice itself, as opposed to the copies on which the notice appears, must
be read with the naked eye or whether the notice is valid if it can be read
only with the aid of a machine.
As explained above, a motion picture sound track is not only copy-
rightable but may also be afforded broader copyright protection than a
sound recording. 91 Since the owner of the copyright to the visual part of a
motion picture is in virtually all cases also the owner of the sound track, a
separate copyright notice on the motion picture for the sound track is not
required under the 1976 Act. But assuming a work of sound is considered
a sound track and is published in the form of a phonorecord (that is, a
sound track album), what kind of copyright notice, if any, should or need
be present on the phonorecord? It is submitted that technically no copy-
right notice need be present on such a phonorecord in order to maintain
copyright protection for the sound track. Section 401(a) of the 1976 Act
requires a copyright notice for a motion picture sound track be present
only on copies of a work;92 and consistent with some case law under the
1909 Act,93 the new legislation does not consider a phonorecord a copy.
94
The section 401 notice is, therefore, not required on phonorecords.
Nonetheless, the prudent attorney should recommend to his client (who is
87. 1976 Act § 401(c).
88. Id.
89. Id.; 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 144; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20,
at 127.
90. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 4, supra note 49, at 67.
91. See text accompanying notes 27-35 supra.
92. The Act provides: "[A] notice of copyright . . . shall be placed on all publicly
distributed copies from which the work can be visually perceived, either directly or with
the aid of a machine device." 1976 Act § 401(a).
93. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955);
Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), all'd, 546 F.2d
461 (2d Cir. 1976); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937).
94. 1976 Act § 101 provides that "'Copies' are material objects, other than phono-
records."
1976 COPYRIGHT ACT: MOTION PICTURES
the owner of a sound track) that a section 401 notice be placed on each
publicly distributed phonorecord incorporating the sound track if for no
other reason than to avoid misunderstandings and to advise the public of
the broader copyright protection afforded the sound track. Moreover, as a
practical matter, a sound track appearing on-a phonorecord will often besomewhat different from the film version, altered by added material,
editing, enhancing and the like. To protect such "new matter"' present
on a sound track album, the owner should place on each phonorecord
embodying that new matter a second copyright notice; that required
under section 402.96
If a work of sound is considered a sound recording, as opposed to a
sound track, the publicly distributed phonorecords embodying the sound
recording should bear only the section 402 notice even though the work
of sound is later incorporated in a sound track of a motion picture. In the
previous example of the sound track being published on a phonorecord it
was possible to place both section 401 and section 402 notices on the
phonorecords embodying the sound track. However, it would likely be
considered a false use of a copyright notice if a section 401 notice
appeared on a phonorecord embodying a work of sound first considered a
sound recording. Such improper use of a copyright notice could subject
the owner of the sound recording to certain criminal penalties under the
new statute.
97
IV. TERM OF PROTECTION
A major and favorable impact of the new law is to provide an addition-
al nineteen years of copyright protection for motion pictures. 98 For
owners of existing "classic" motion pictures, whose timelessness makes
them highly profitable for many years, this added term is extremely
significant. For motion pictures already protected under the 1909 Act,
the nineteen years are merely added onto the former renewal copyright
term of twenty-eight years. 99 In order to obtain this extended protection
95. -See note 34 supra.
96. Such notices should consist of the symbol®, the year the new matter was first
published, plus the name of the'owner of the new matter. 1976 Act § 402(b).
97. Id. § 506(c) directs:
Any person who, with fraudulent intent, places on any article a notice of copyright or
words of the same purport that slich person knows to be false, or who, with fraudu-
lent intent, publicly distributes or imports for public distribution any article bearing
such notice or words that such person knows to be false, shall be fined not more than
$2500.00.
Id. (emphasis added).
98. Compare 1976 Act § 304(a), (b) with 1909 Act § 24.
99. Id.
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for motion pictures in their original term of copyright protection under
the 1909 Act, renewal registration must, of course, be made. 1°° For
motion pictures not registered under the 1909 Act, or created but not
published prior to January 1, 1978101 and for motion pictures created on
or after that date, the term of protection lasts generally for seventy-five
years from the date the motion picture is published or one hundred years
from creation, whichever occurs first."° This term of protection for
motion pictures stems from a definition of the section 302(c) language
"works made for hire." Both judicial decisions'0 3 and the new law104
consider motion pictures to fall within the definition of such works.
V. RIGHTS OF MOTION PICTURE OWNERS
The 1976 Act does provide the owner of motion pictures with new
rights in some cases and, perhaps more importantly, with clarifications of
some of the doubtful areas that existed under section 1 of the 1909 Act.
The exclusive rights granted copyright owners of motion pictures are
found in section 106, with the exception of the new right of importation
which is found in section 602. As will be explained below, these rights
are subject to some new limitations, but on the whole the motion picture
industry significantly benefits from the new order of rights set forth in the
1976 Act. Among the most important rights granted the motion picture
owner are the right to reproduce in copies or phonorecords, 1 5 the right to
perform a motion picture publicly, °6 the right to distribute copies of a
100. 1976 Act § 304(a). It should be noted that while the period for renewing a copyright
is still a year before the expiration of the twenty-eighth year of protection, the twenty-
eighth year of protection now always ends on December 31. Hence, the period of renewal
consistently extends from January 1 to December 31. Id. § 305; 1976 House Report, supra
note 20, at 142-43; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 125-26.
101. The standards to be used to determine whether a motion picture has been publish-
ed prior to January 1, 1978 are those of the 1909 Act. 1976 Act, Transitional and
Supplementary Provisions §§ 103 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. note preced. § 101), 109 (to
be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 410 note), 112 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 501 note).
102. 1976 Act §§ 303, 302(c).
103. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 59 F.2d 70,
77 (1st Cir. 1932); Zahler v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 180 Cal. App. 2d 582, 589, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 612, 617 (1960). In extraordinary circumstances involving a very early motion
picture, a court has found a motion picture to be a creation of a single individual. Epoch
Prod. Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955
(1976) (regarding the 1914 production of D.W. Griffith's classic movie "Birth of a
Nation").
104. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 3, supra note 49, at 258. Cf. 1976 House Report,
supra note 20, at 121; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 104 (discussing works made
for hire).
105. See notes 109-12 infra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 113-26 infra and accompanying text.
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motion picture to the public,10 7 and the right of public display. 10 8
A. Right to Reproduce in Copies or Phonorecords
The right to copy under section 1(a) of the 1909 Act was for various
reasons deemed inadequate; 1°9 and as a consequence the right to repro-
duce a copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords was expressly pro-
vided for in place of the 1909 provision.110 Section 106(1) grants the
copyright owner of a motion picture the right to prevent the unauthorized
reproduction of his work onto videotape or videodisc, even though the
tape or disc is later erased.III This is consistent with prior law."
I2
B. Right to Perform a Motion Picture Publicly
Although this right was provided for in the prior statute, 1 3 some
confusion existed as to whether or not it applied to both photoplay and
non-photoplay motion pictures. The courts had universally held that an
unauthorized public screening of a motion picture photoplay was a
-violation of the public performance right in the 1909 Act. 114 The courts
had a more difficult time, however, interpreting the scope of protection
afforded the copyright owner from unauthorized public exhibitions of
non-photoplay motion pictures." 5 In the landmark case of Patterson v.
107. See notes 127-33 infra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 134-35 infra and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo, 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (inter-
preting the right to copy in a copyright statute that preceded the 1909 Act); Corcoran v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1941) (recording of copyrighted poem oh
sound recording held not to violate the owner's exclusive right to copy). But see Khan v.
Leo Feist, Inc., 78 F. 'Supp. 754, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) wherein a district court in the
Second Circuit declined to follow Corcoran. Section 106(1) of the 1976 Act is also
intended to include the rights formerly granted copyright owners under § l(b) and, as they
relate to recording, § I(c), (e) of the 1909 Act. See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 3, supra
note 49, at 109.
110. Section 106(1) of the 1976 Act which relates to the owner's reproduction rights is
discussed in COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 3, supra note 49, at 109.
I11. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 3, supra note 49, at 113, 116-17; COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION Pt. 6, supra note 20, at 17-18.
112. Walt Disney Prods. v. Alaska Television Network, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D.
Wash. 1969) (holding that when the defendant videotaped the plaintiff's televised program
for non-simultaneous showing, he infringed the owner's rights).
113. 1909 Act § l(d).
114. Id. See United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. 390, 395
(1968); Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 882 (1960); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distri. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 59 F.2d
70, 77 (1st Cir. 1932); Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,,431 U.S. 949 (1977);
Vitaphone Corp. v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 28 F. Supp. 526, 529-31 (D. Mass. 1939);
Tiffany Prods., Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911, 915 (D. Md. 1931).
115. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138
(N.D. Tex. 1976). At least one court stated that a public exhibition of a non-photoplay
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Century Productions, Inc. ,16 a distinguished panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 17 felt forced to hold that the
exclusive right of public performance under section 1(d) did not attach to
a motion picture which was not a photoplay. Rather, the court upheld the
finding of an infringement on the ground that the unauthorized public
exhibitor of such a work violated the companion right to copy. In
affirming an injunction against the further public exhibition of plaintiff's
travelogue film clips by the defendant, the court found that "when the
film was shown the defendants who did that made an enlarged copy of
the picture. It was to be sure temporary but still a copy while it
lasted."1 8
The necessity for such judicial convolutions has been eliminated under
the 1976 Act. If any motion picture, including a non-photoplay, is
publicly exhibited without the consent of the appropriate copyright own-
er, such exhibition violates the exclusive right of public performance
granted the copyright owner in section 106(4) of the 1976 Act."19
The performance of the motion picture must be public in order for
there to be any infringement. What constituted a "public" performance
was less than clear under the prior law. This was exemplified in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Wyatt.120 The case involved the
unauthorized exhibition of a motion picture photoplay before a rather
large group of persons who were members of a private yacht club. The
Wyatt court held that the screening was not public within the meaning of
the statute, since only club members and not the public at large were
invited to attend the screening.121
The section 101 definition of the word "publicly" is intended to
overrule cases such as Wyatt and to make performances in "semi-
public" places such as clubs, summer camps and, importantly, schools,
subject to copyright protection. A place is "public" under the 1976 Act
motion picture is an infringement under § l(b) of the 1909 Act. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Distrib. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 3 F. Supp. 66, 73 (D. Mass. 1933) (dictum).
116. 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1938).
117. Id. (Learned Hand, Augustus Hand and Chase, JJ., heard the case in the Second
Circuit).
118. Id. at 493.
119. 1976 Act § 106(4). Section 101 states, in relevant part, that to "perform" a work
"means . . . in the case of a motion picture . . . to show its images in any sequence or to
make the sounds accompanying it audible." See also 1976 House Report, supra note 20,
at 63-64; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 59-61; REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH
CONG., IsT SEss., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION Pt. 1, at 28-29 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinaf-
ter cited as COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 1].
120. 21 Copy. DEC. 203 (D. Md. 1932).
121. Id. at 206.
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if gathered there are "a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of a family or its social acquaintances. " 22 To the extent that Wyatt
was good law, this new definition will substantially broaden the copy-
right protection afforded owners and provide them with new authority to
halt unauthorized screenings of motion pictures.
Although the public performance right will expressly extend to televi-
sion for the first time,123 that right is somewhat limited under the new
Act. The original television broadcaster or cablecaster who televises a
motion picture to the public without authority definitely infringes the
public performance right. 24 As a general rule, however, the authorized
simultaneous retransmission of signals broadcasting motion pictures for
television reception will not constitute an infringement, provided the
retransmitter complies with the compulsory license provisions of the new
Act or one of the many exemptions available is applicable. 25 If the
retransmitter does not comply with the compulsory license provision and
is not otherwise afforded an exemption, he is liable for infringement. 1
26
C. Right to Distribute Copies of a Motion Picture to the Public
This right, found in section 106(3) of the 1976 Act, is intended to
broaden and clarify the rights to vend and publish. 127 Under section
106(3) it is an infringement to distribute prints, videotapes or videodiscs
of motion pictures to even one128 member of the public. A sale of a copy
of a motion picture or its distribution by gift, lease, loan or rental without
the consent of the copyright owner of the motion picture is an infringe-
ment of the right to public distribution.' 29
122. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 64; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 60-
61.
123. The unauthorized television exhibition of a motion picture was, however, con-
sidered an infringement of the public performance right under § 1(d) of the 1909 Act. See
generally Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977); Pickford Corp. v.
DeLuxe Laboratories, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 118 (S.D. Cal. 1958). See COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION Pt. 1, supra note 119, at 23.
124. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 64-65; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
61.
125. 1976 Act § 111. See Meyer, The Feat of Houdini or How the New Act Disentangles
the CA TV-Copyright Knot, 22 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 545 (1977).
126. 1976 Act § II1(c)(2)-(4).
127. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 3, supra note 49, at 110.
128. Although § 106 refers to the plural "copies," the singular use of the word "copy"
is also intended. See note 48 supra.
129. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 62; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 58-
59.
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The right to distribute can be violated even if the copies distributed
were not lawfully made, that is, if the copies distributed were piratical. 13 0
Further, section 106(3) allows the copyright owner of a motion picture to
prevent not only its unauthorized rental, but also its subrental.13' Under
the 1909 Act the right to publish in section 1(a) did afford the copyright
owner this capability, provided the license was drafted narrowly
enough. 132 Absent an effective license restriction, the owner's only
recourse was in an action for breach of contract against the unauthorized
subrenter. 1
33
D. Right of Display
This is a new right in United States copyright law and will have only
limited application to motion pictures, though by its specific terms in
section 106(5) it does extend to displays of individual, nonsequential,
images of a motion picture. 134 If the images are displayed sequentially
and create the impression of motion, such a display to the public would
violate the public performance right of section 106(4) and not the right of
display. 13
5
VI. RIGHTS ATTACHING TO UNDERLYING WORKS
In addition to being a copyright owner, the motion picture producer is
a user of copyrighted works, and awareness of some of the more im-
portant rights relating to works which might be incorporated in motion
pictures is, therefore, essential.
A. Synchronization Right
The right to reproduce includes the so-called "synchronization right,"
which is the right to record copyrighted works onto a sound track of a
motion picture in timed relation with the action in the movie. 136 In
130. Id.
131. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 80; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 73.
132. Twentieth Century-Fox Corp. v. Peoples Theatres of Ala., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 793
(M.D. Ala. 1938); Vitaphone Corp. v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 19 F. Supp. 359 (D.
Mass. 1937).
133. It should be noted, however, that the exclusive right to public distribution is
limited by the first sale doctrine. See text accompanying notes 199-216 infra.
134. Section 106(5) provides an exclusive right "including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly." 1976
Act § 106(5).
135. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 64; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 60.
Like public distribution rights, the right of display is limited by the first sale doctrine as
discussed in text accompanying notes 199-216 infra. See also text accompanying notes
144-46 infra regarding the right of display with respect to underlying works.
136. 1976 Act § 106(1).
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practice, the exclusive synchronization right is most frequently exercised
in connection with musical compositions. 
137
There was no reference to such a synchronization right in the 1909 Act
or its legislative history and there was some uncertainty regarding its
statutory source. 138 At least one commentator argued that the compulsory
license provision found in section 1(e) applied to the synchronization
right and that the movie producer could, as a result, record music on the
film sound track without the consent of the music's copyright owner.
139
The producer under this theory could have merely paid two cents for
every copy of the motion picture he had manufactured. Such an argu-
ment, to the extent it was viable at all (this notion was apparently never
seriously tested by any producer), 14° is silenced under the 1976 Act. In
particular, the legislative history of the new section 115 compulsory
license provision for musical compositions expresses Congress' intent
that the recording of music on sound tracks is not within the scope of that
section.,4 Consequently, the industry practice of negotiating synchroni-
zation licenses will undoubtedly continue.
B. Right to Prepare Derivative Works
Section 106(2) grants to copyright owners the exclusive right to pre-
pare derivative works based upon their copyrighted work. It includes the
right to prepare a "motion picture version" of a copyrighted work.142
This right is analogous to a right granted to authors under the 1909
Act. 
43
137. The right to reproduce is not, however, so limited. It applies to every type of work
protected under the statute. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 61; 1975 Senate Report,
supra note 20, at 57.
138. The courts held that § l(e) of the 1909 Act could be interpreted to provide authority
for synchronization rights for musical compositions. Famous Music Corp. v. Melz, 28 F.
Supp. 767 (W.D. La. 1939); accord, Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d
627 (2d Cir. 1952) (dictum). The basis for the right to record other types of works onto
sound tracks was found in other parts of § 1, since § 1(e) applied only to musical
compositions. But see note 109 supra.
139. Dubin, Copyright Aspects of Sound Recordings, 26 S. CAL. L. REV. 139 (1953).
140. In dictum, one court held the compulsory license provision was not applicable to
recording musical compositions onto a motion picture sound track. Jerome v. Twentieth-
Century Fox Film Corp., 67 F. Supp. 736, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
141. 1976 Act § 115(a)(1); 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 108; 1975 Senate
Report, supra note 20, at 88.
142. A "derivative work" is defined as a "work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a. . . motion picture version .... ." 1976 Act § 101.
143. E.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir.
1944); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1936);
International Film Serv. Co. v. Affiliated Distribs., 283 F. 229, 234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911).
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C. Right of Display
While this right may not be of major significance to copyright owners
in protecting their motion pictures, 144 it is important for owners of
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works 45 used in motion pictures. The
presence of such a work in a motion picture could well violate the right of
display when the motion picture is publicly exhibited, even though the
pictorial, graphic or sculptural work is merely in the background of a
scene." The producer who uses such a work in a motion picture should
be certain, except in clearly de minimus situations, to obtain the consent
of the copyright owner before releasing that motion picture for distribu-
tion.
VII. LIMITATIONS ON RIGHTS
Like first amendment freedoms, the rights of copyright owners under
the new Act are not absolute. Rather, the 1976 Act contains multiple
limitations on the exercise of otherwise exclusive rights.
A. Fair Use and Cable TV Compulsory License Requirement
There are two highly significant limitations on the rights of motion
picture copyright owners: fair use and the compulsory cable television
license. Each area is of sufficient complexity to form the basis of a
separate article, and they are consequently not considered here beyond
noting that their impact on exclusive rights is considerable. The 1976
Act's treatment of these subjects has been analyzed in detail elsewhere
and the reader is invited to review those studies. 147
144. See text accompanying notes 134-35 supra.
145. "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," a class of subject matter protected by
the 1976 Act under § 102(a)(5), includes all of the works formerly protected in §§ 5(f)
(Class F- "maps."), 5(g) (Class G-"Works of art; models or designs for works of
art."), 5(h) (Class H-"Reproductions of a work of art."), 5(i) (Class I-"Drawings or
plastic works of a scientific or technical character."), 5(j) (Class J-"Photographs."), and
5(k) (Class K-"Prints and pictorial illustrations including prints or labels used for articles
of merchandise."). 1909 Act § 5(f)-(k). See 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 54; 1975
Senate Report, supra note 20, at 53.
146. See COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION Pt. 3, supra note 49, at 192; COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION Pt. 6, supra note 20, at 30.
147. See, e.g., Freid, Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REV. 497 (1977);
Meyer, The Feat of Houdini or How the New Act Disentangles the CATV-Copyright
Knot, 22 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 545 (1977); Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copy-
right: The "Exclusive Rights" Tensions in the New Copyright Act, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 215 (1977).
[Vol. 11
1976 COPYRIGHT ACT: MOTION PICTURES
B. Copying by Libraries
Section 108, which permits libraries and archives to reproduce certain
copyrighted works without permission, generally excludes motion pic-
tures from its coverage. 148 There are, however, several noteworthy ex-
ceptions to this general exclusion. A copy of an unpublished motion
picture, already a part of an institution's collection, may be reproduced
and distributed in a limited way by certain libraries 14 9 or archives for
preservation or security purposes or for sending a copy to another similar
library or archives for research purposes. 150 Because this right of repro-
duction and distribution only applies to "unpublished" motion pic-
tures,15" ' it is expected that this exemption will have little if any serious
effect on the commercial motion picture industry which usually pub-
lishes"'52 such works.
A more serious exemption is found in subparagraph (c) of section 108,
which grants the same type of library or archives the right to reproduce
for its own collection a copy of a published motion picture to replace a
damaged, deteriorating, lost or stolen copy already in its collection.1
53
The only significant impediment to exercising this right is that the
archives or library must first make a presumably good faith determina-
tion, after reasonable effort, that an unused replacement cannot be
obtained at a "fair price." 154 Of course, exactly what a fair price is will
differ from one entity or film to another. It can only be hoped that the
archives and libraries utilizing this exemption will not abuse it by adopt-
ing their own standards of fair price in lieu of those of the marketplace. 155
Another exemption, but of limited application to the motion picture
industiy, relates to "audiovisual news" programs. The covered libraries
148. 1976 Act § 108(h); 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 78-79.
149. The library must be open to the public or to all who are doing research in a
specialized field. This category essentially excludes commercial libraries. 1976 Act §
108(a)(2); 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 74; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20; at
67.
150. 1976 Act § 108(b).
151. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 75; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 68.
152. But see text accompanying notes 38-52 supra.
153. 1976 Act § 108(c) provides:
The right of reproduction under this section applies to a copy ... of a published
work duplicated in facsimile form solely for the purpose of replacement of a copy
that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen, if the library or archives has, after
a reasonable effort, determined that an unused replacement cannot be obtained at a
fair price.
(emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Department of Highways v. Wall, 32 So. 2d 718,719 (Ct. App. La. 1947)
("fair price" in an eminent domain statute held to mean market value).
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and archives may freely copy these shows, provided that only a limited
number of copies are made and loaned.1 56 This is the so-called "Vander-
bilt University Amendment" to the Act."5 7
C. Educational Institutions-Public Performance and Display
A major limitation on the exclusive rights of motion picture proprietors
not found in section 108 allows non-profit educational institutions and
their faculty to exhibit motion pictures or to display portions of them in
face to face teaching activities. 158 The exhibition or display must occur in
a classroom or a similar place of instruction. Additionally, the person
responsible for the exhibition or display must not have had reason to
believe that the copy of the motion picture being exhibited was not
"lawfully made." 5 9 Face to face teaching activities include televi-
sion transmission of a motion picture by the school, as long as the
television receiver is in a classroom and the transmitter is located in the
same building as the television receivers.160
VIII. COPYRIGHT RENEWAL
A. Registration
The new law eliminates the need to renew copyrights first secured
under the 1976 Act. 161 Unfortunately, the nuisance of renewing copy-
156. 1976 Act § 108(f)(3); 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 76-77. A related section,
§ 113(b) of the Transitional and Supplementary Provisions, allows the Library of Congress
to reproduce off the air regularly scheduled newscasts and on-the-spot coverage of news
events for the Library's archives and for limited loan purposes. 1976 Act, Transitional
and Supplementary Provisions § 113(b) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 170).
157. CBS, Inc. had brought a copyright infringement action against Vanderbilt Univer-
sity for taping off the air, on a daily basis, programs of the "CBS Evening News" and for
the unauthorized rental of the tapes of those programs. The University was able to
persuade one of Tennessee's United States Senators, Howard Baker, to introduce an
amendment to the copyright revision legislation that, upon adoption, made the lawsuit
moot, at least as to activities after January 1, 1978. See Conference Report, supra note 52,
at 73. The CBS lawsuit was dropped after the new law, with the Vanderbilt University
Amendment, was enacted.
158. 1976 Act § 110(1); 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 82-83; 1975 Senate Report,
supra note 20, at 73-74.
159. If the institution or teacher acquired possession of a copy of a motion picture
pursuant to a license agreement that restricted a particular type of exhibition allowed
under § 110(1) (for example, televising the motion picture), the school or teacher responsi-
ble for such an exhibition would not be liable for copyright infringement, but could
nevertheless be subject to an action for breach of contract. 1976 House Report, supra
note 20, at 82; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 74.
160. Id. There is some question whether or not the exemption covers a transmitter
located outside the building in which the receivers are situated. It is certainly clear that the
transmitter must be located in the same cluster of buildings containing the receivers.
161. 1976 Act § 302(c).
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rights to motion pictures in their original term of protection as of January
1, 1978 still remains. The second, or renewal term of copyright protec-
tion, does last, however, for forty-seven years for those subsisting
works, 162 rather than twenty-eight years as under the prior statute.
1 63
It is important to note that the period for copyright renewal has
changed. For motion picture copyrights secured under the 1909 Act, the
renewal period will always begin on January 1 of the year in which the
twenty-eighth year of protection ended and terminate on December 31 of
that same year. 164
Except for the alteration in the renewal period, the renewal provision
of the 1976 Act regarding copyrights subsisting on January 1, 1978 has
remained virtually the same as under the 1909 Act. This is true even
though that provision contained ambiguous language and generated much
litigation. 165 Using a kind of reverse logic, Congress decided not to
change the language for fear it would affect interests vested long ago and
further recognized that the courts had over the years interpreted the
provision and had given it a fairly certain meaning.
166
B. Reversion of Rights
Because the renewal provision has not been changed, motion picture
producers and distributors will continue to be subject to a reversion of
United States rights if, for instance, the author of a work incorporated in
a motion picture dies prior to the vesting of the renewal copyright for that
work. 167 It was thought by many that a reversion of the motion picture
rights to such underlying works could subject the motion picture produc-
er and distributor to a copyright infringement action for the further
distribution and exhibition of the film, unless the consent of the owner of
the renewal copyright was obtained. 168
162. Id. § 304(a), (b).
163. 1909 Act § 24.
164. 1976 Act § 305.
165. See, e.g., Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960);
DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); Fred Fisher Music Co., v. M. Witmark &
Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943); Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles, 261 U.S. 326 (1923); Rohauer v.
Killiam Shows, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977); Bartok v.
Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1975).
166. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 139; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
122.
167. See Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960). This
assumes that the producer had not already obtained assignments of the renewal expectan-
cy from the appropriate statutory successor(s) of the author.
168. See, e.g., A. LATMAN, HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW 123 (1962); M. NIMMER, NIM-
MER ON COPYRIGHT § 118 (1976).
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The producer's vulnerability to such a reversion of rights will, how-
ever, be somewhat reduced because of the relatively recent case of
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. ,169 which involved the motion picture
use of a story the author of which died prior to the copyright renewal
vesting. The successor-owner of the renewal copyright brought an action
against a distributor who had licensed the televising of the motion picture
during the story's renewal term of protection.170 In Rohauer, the Second
Circuit held that the assignee of the producer who had made the film
pursuant to a license agreement with the author could continue to manu-
facture and distribute copies of the picture for exhibition during the
story's renewal period of protection, even though the ownership of the
renewal copyright had reverted to the author's statutory successors.
C. Certificate of Copyright Renewal
A problem related to the renewal of copyrights already subsisting as of
January 1, 1978 is the evidentiary value of the certificate of renewal
copyright. In another fairly recent infringement case, Epoch Producing
Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc. ,1 it was held that the certificate of
renewal copyright is not prima facie evidence of copyright renewal
ownership. The court found that the language of section 209 of the 1909
Act granting a prima facie effect to a certificate of copyright registration
applied only to the certificate for the original term of copyright protec-
tion, and not to the certificate for the renewal term. Since the only new
fact present in the renewal certificate that is generally not present in the
certificate for the first copyright term is the ownership statement, the
Epoch case would appear only to require plaintiffs to present evidence on
the renewal ownership issue in order to establish a prima facie case of
copyright validity. Thus, for motion pictures the copyrights to which
were secured under the 1909 Act, it would appear that the Epoch
decision dictates that the renewal owner present written copyright assign-
meht(s) proving his title, if the registered copyright owner for the original
term differs from the renewal copyright owner. Also, if the certificate of
registration for the first term does not contain a statement on the author-
ship line that indicates in some way that the person or firm listed as the
169. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
170. One point the court did not need to decide, and did not discuss, was whether the
result would have been the same had the producer not made a motion picture based on the
author's story during the initial 28 years of copyright protection. The issue remains to be
resolved in some future case.
171. 522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976).
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author was an employer in the case of a work made for hire, 172 the
plaintiff/copyright owner probably has the burden of producing evidence
that the infringed motion picture was, in fact, a work made for hire. 173
Such evidence could include relevant employment contracts, pay re-
cords, or other employment documents relating to the supervisory per-
sonnel who actually made the motion picture while employed by the
picture's author.
It is submitted that the Epoch case has not been overruled by the 1976
Act. The first sentence of section 410(c) states that only certificates of
registration made before or within five years after first publication of the
work covered by the registration will be entitled to prima facie evidence
of both copyright validity and of the facts stated in the certificate.174
Since renewal registrations can be made no sooner than twenty-seven
years after publication,175 the facts recited in renewal certificates for
published motion pictures are not assured prima facie effect under section
410(c).
Renewal certificates for unpublished motion pictures may, however,
be treated differently. At least for published motion pictures, the eviden-
tiary value of renewal copyright certificates appears to be covered by the
second sentence of section 410(c), which allows the court discretion in
determining the evidentiary weight to be accorded all certificates to
which the first sentence of section 410(c) does not apply. Renewal certifi-
cates for unpublished motion pictures may, however, always be granted
172. If the authorship statement in the certificate of registration for the original term
does refer to the author as an employer, rather than as an individual author, it should be
granted prima facie effect. The authorship statement appearing in the certificate of
registration for the initial copyright term is not subject to the Epoch limitation, since that
decision applied only to renewal copyright certificates. The two registration certificates
for the motion picture involved in Epoch apparently referred merely to D.W. Griffith, the
individual, as the author.
173. This assumes that the renewal owner claimed in his application that he was a
proprietor of a work made for hire. 1976 Act § 304(a). It is arguable that Epoch is
applicable only to motion pictures produced in the very early stages of the industry's
development. The extensive unionization of the modern motion picture industry testifies
to the fact that it has not been possible for some time to produce, as a practical matter, a
motion picture without it being a work made for hire. The days of D.W. Griffith, the
individual producer of the motion picture involved in the Epoch case, have long been
over.
174. Section 410(c) provides:
In any judicial proceedings the certificate of registration made before or within five
years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyright and of the fact stated in the certificate. The evidentiary
weight to be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within
the discretion of the court.
1976 Act § 410(c).
175. Id. § 304(a).
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prima facie effect, since renewal registration for such works must by
definition occur before publication.
IX. RIGHT OF TERMINATION
Although there is no reversion of rights resulting from a renewal for
works first protected under the 1976 Act,176 the new law does provide
authors of those works a "right of termination" in section 203. The
expressed purpose for the elimination of the old renewal provision for
such works was to avoid unnecessary litigation. 177 Unfortunately, section
203 will probably create its own plethora of court cases attempting to
interpret its provisions. Its terms and conditions are many and, in some
cases, ambiguous, despite an attempt in the House and Senate reports to
clarify the language in the relevant sections.
The right of termination is also applicable to works protected under the
1909 Act. Thus, sections 203 and 304(c) operate together to create for
such works a possibility of a reversion of rights separate from and in
addition to the one that exists under the renewal section. Hence, the
copyright owner of such a motion picture must not only continue to be
concerned about the renewal reversion of at least nonexclusive 78 rights
to underlying works protected under the prior statute, but he must also be
aware of a second and new risk of a reversion of underlying rights under
sections 203 and 304(c).
Section 304(c) allows certain designated persons to terminate contracts
involving works at the end of their fifty-sixth year of protection under the
1909 Act. Consequently, the section has an immediate impact on the
motion picture industry. Its purpose is to grant the author or his heirs the
chance to receive compensation for the additional nineteen years of
protection 179 granted in the 1976 Act. 80
176. Id. §§ 302, 303. Congress felt that the renewal provisions under the prior law had
caused unjust loss of copyright in numerous cases and decided to eliminate it, except for
works protected under the 1909 Act. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 124, 134; 1975
Senate Report, supra note 20, at 108, 117-18. See the discussion of reversion of rights in
text accompanying notes 167-70. An interesting statistic cited by the Register of Copy-
rights in the early stages of copyright revision was that 30% of all motion picture
copyrights were not renewed. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. I, supra note 119, at 51.
177. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 6, supra note 20, at 71.
178. Under the holding of Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977), a producer may continue to exploit a motion picture he
produced under license even aftei a renewal reversion, but he apparently may not stop the
owner of the reverted rights from licensing a third party to make a motion picture based on
the same work. His rights after the renewal reversion become, in a sense, nonexclusive in
the United States.
179. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 140; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
123.
180. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
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It is noteworthy that section 304(c) affects assignments or licenses,
whether exclusive or nonexclusive, consummated prior to January 1,
1978,181 and only involves works protected under the prior Act. For
example, a purchase agreement dated December 31, 1977 or before,
which conveys exclusive motion picture rights to an unpublished story
not registered 182 under the 1909 Act, would not be subject to the right of
termination under section 304(c). 183 Further, transfers concerning only
works made for hire are not covered by this new reversion right.
The mechanics of how and when one may exercise the right of
termination.under section 304(c) are beyond the scope of this article;
1 84
but it is important to note that there are several conditions for exercising
that right under section 304(c), and the owner of motion picture rights
should be careful to see that all of them have been met before even
impliedly acknowledging that a right of termination is being properly
exercised. 185
It will be some time before the right of termination under section 203
will have any great significance, since that right relates only to contracts
181. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION Pt. 5, at 241 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION Pt. 5]; COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 6, supra note 20, at 95.
182. Most stories had to be published in order to be protected, but some stories in
dramatic or dramatic-musical form or lectures or similar productions prepared for oral
delivery, were registrable in unpublished form under § 5 (c) and (d) of the 1909 Act. 37
C.F.R. § 202.6 -.7 (1977).
183. Section 304(c) applies only to works "subsisting in either [their] first or renewal
term on January 1, 1978." 1976 Act § 304(c). This language eliminates works not protected
by copyright under the prior Act from the section's coverage. See COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION Pt. 4, supra note 49, at 41, 53. A pre-1978 grant that concerns a work not
published or registered at the time of the grant but for which copyright was secured under
the prior Act would, in the author's opinion, still not be subject to the right of termination
under § 304(c). Both the House Report and Senate Report in describing the operation of §
304(c) state: "In the case of either a first-term or renewal copyright already subsisting
when the new statute becomes effective, any grant of rights covering the renewal copyright
in the work, executed before the effective date, may be terminated. . . ." 1976 House
Report, supra note 20, at 140; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 123 (emphasis
added). An unpublished unregistered work does not at the time of the grant have a renewal
copyright that can technically be covered by the grant. Moreover, the major reason behind
the adoption of § 304(c) was to allow authors or their successors the opportunity to take
advantage of the new windfall of 19 years of additional protection. When the parties made
the bargain, the story had perpetual protection under common law. The windfall is,
therefore, not lost, because what was bargained for was perpetual protection.
184. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.10(0(4) (1977); Karp, Transfer and Termination and Fair Use,
13 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 13 (1965); Nimmer, Termination of Transfer Under the
Copyright Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 947 (1977); Stein, Termination of Transfers and
Licenses Under the New Copyright Act: Thorny Problems for the Copyright Bar, 24
UCLA L. REV. 1141 (1977).
185. The recordation of a notice of termination by the Copyright Office does not in any
way create a presumption that the notice is valid. 37 C.F.R. § 201.10(0(4) (1977).
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entered into on or after January 1, 1978 and may be fully exercised no
earlier than thirty-five years after the contract was executed, 186 a period
so far attenuated from the present that analysis of its impact must be
limited. Like section 304(c), section 203 does not cover contracts involv-
ing only works made for hire and, significantly, it applies only to
contracts involving the work's author. 187 Again, as with section 304(c),
the owner of motion picture rights should be vigilant in assuring that all
conditions to an attempted exercise of this right of termination have been
met before recognizing that an effective exercise has taken place. The
conditions are plentiful and intricate.
The right of termination was fought tooth and nail by the motion
picture industry.'88 To obtain industry support for at least some form of
termination right, some concessions had to be made, two of which are
especially important to the motion picture producer and distributor.
First, the owner of a derivative work, such as a motion picture
legitimately made under the contract being terminated, can continue to
exploit that derivative work without the consent of those entitled to
terminate. 189 This does not mean that the owner of a motion picture made
under license could make another motion picture containing the same
derivative story line or make a sequel to such a motion picture; rather, it
allows the owner to continue to distribute the already completed motion
picture. I° Also, all pre-existing works incorporated in a motion picture,
even those incorporated without change, will be considered derivative
works for purposes of sections 304(c) and 203 and may be exploited as
part of that motion picture, even after a right of termination has been
exercised as to those works.191
The second major concession to those opposed to the existence of a
right of termination was the preferential bargaining position that the
grantee or his successor is given. Only that person can make a binding
186. 1976 Act § 203(a)(3).
187. Id. § 203(a).
188. See, e.g., STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., IST SESS.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 2, at 360-62 (Comm. Print 1963); COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
Pt. 3, supra note 49, at 280-81; Proposed Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: Hearings on
H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 996-97 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 House Hearings].
189. 1976 Act §§ 304(c)(6)(A), 203(b)(1). A motion picture based on a story is con-
sidered a derivative work. Id. § 101; COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 6, supra note 20, at 75.
See note 142 supra.
190. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 127; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
111; accord, 1965 House Hearings, supra note 188, at 997.
191. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 127; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
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contract reacquiring the rights from those entitled to terminate prior to the
actual termination or reversion of United States rights. No one but the
grantee or his successor is in a position to make such an agreement. The
preferential bargaining period begins when the notice of termination is
served and ends when the termination becomes effective. 192 Since the
notice of termination may not be served earlier than ten years nor later
than two years before the effective date of termination, 193 the preferential
bargaining period can extend from a minimum of two years to a max-
imum of ten.
One further and related benefit to the grantee or his successor results
from the fact that the right of termination affects only the United States
rights, 94 which in practical effect may preclude the owner(s) of the
reverted motion picture rights from selling those rights to third parties.
There does not appear to be a great deal a motion picture producer can
do beforehand to protect his motion picture against an exercise of the
right of termination. The right may not be contracted or waived away
before it has actually been exercised. 91
Because works made for hire are not subject to the right of termina-
tion, 196 the producer of a motion picture can at least limit his exposure to
the consequences of termination by making certain that, where practic-
able, the works incorporated in his film are works made for hire.
Creating and retaining documentation establishing that works in a motion
picture are indeed works made for hire would appear to be the prudent
path to follow. The fact that contracts involving works made for hire are
not subject to the right of termination also means that most long term
motion picture distribution agreements' 97 are free from the reversion
192. 1976 Act §§ 304(c)(6)(D), 203(b)(4); 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 127. The
Justice Department strongly opposed such a preferred bargaining position for grantees,
without success. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 188, at 1129; Proposed Amendments to
the U.S. Copyright Law: Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., Ist Sess.
55 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1967).
193. 1976 Act §§ 304(c)(4)(A), 203(a)(4)(A).
194. Id. §§ 304(c)(6)(E), 203(b)(5). See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 6, supra note 20,
at 75.
195. 1976 Act §§ 304(c)(6)(D), 203(b)(4).
196. See notes 183-85 supra and accompanying text.
197. The right of termination is not relevant to transfers of less than 35 years duration
consummated on or after January 1, 1978 (1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 128; 1975
Senate Report, supra note 20, at 111), or to contracts executed before January 1, 1978
whose term expires before the right of termination can be exercised.
An intriguing suggestion of, whenever possible, acquiring perpetual exclusive rights to
title of a work and the characters therein, including their names, to avoid the effects of §
203 was made in a recently published article. Stein, Termination of Transfers and Licenses
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established by sections 304(c) and 203.198
X. FIRST SALE DocTRINE
One of the more perplexing problems facing the motion picture indus-
try in recent years has been the first sale doctrine as defined in the 1909
Act. The last clause in section 27 sets forth the basic element of that
doctrine under the prior law: "[N]othing in this title shall be deemed to
forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work
the possession of which has been lawfully obtained." 1 99
This section, while seemingly clear, was not always easy to apply. For
instance, if the owner of a motion picture sold copies of his film to third
parties, what rights, if any, did he retain in his work? Could he have
halted the public exhibition of that copy of his motion picture if he did not
grant the purchaser that right? Although the answer was eventually
decided in the affirmative, it took a landmark case, Hampton v.
Paramount Pictures Corp. ,2o to resolve the question.
In the Hampton case Paramount, the copyright owner, had licensed a
third party to manufacture and sell 16mm prints of its copyrighted motion
picture photoplay "The Covered Wagon." Hampton had purchased a
legitimate 16mm print of the film and publicly exhibited the motion
picture in his theater. Paramount sued for the infringement of its right of
public performance under section l(d) of the 1909 Act, and Hampton
defended on the ground that under the first sale doctrine, as expressed in
section 27, the copyright owner parted with his right of public perform-
ance when he sold a copy of his copyrighted motion picture. 20' After all,
Hampton contended, there were no express restrictions against public
performance on either the copy he purchased or on its packaging. 202 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed and stated
that the sale of a copy of a copyrighted motion picture did not automatic-
ally transfer to the purchaser the separate right of public performance.
20 3
The Hampton case is just one example of the problems that developed
with regard to the first sale doctrine under the 1909 Act.2 ' 4 The first sale
Under the New Copyright Act: Thorny Problems forthe Copyright Bar, 24 UCLA L. REv.
1141, 1161-62 (1977).
198. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
199. 1909 Act § 27.
200. 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960).
201. Id. at 103.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. For a study of some of the other problems the courts had in interpreting the
proviso in § 27, see Nolan, All Rights Not Reserved After the First Sale, 23 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 76 (1975).
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doctrine under the 1909 Act also presented serious evidentiary problems.
The members of at least the theatrical motion picture industry have had a
long standing practice of never selling copies of their motion pictures,
205
except for short excerpts (usually in 8mm). However, so-called "film
collectors" (and out and out pirates) were raising the first sale doctrine as
a defense in actions brought against them by producers and distributors to
recover copies of their motion pictures. This effort forced the plaintiffs in
one case, American International Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman,26 to prove
the negative that they had not sold any prints of the motion pictures
involved in the suit.
Other courts, disagreeing with the Foreman decision, have required
the defendants to prove legitimate title to the motion picture copy in their
possession, if they choose to raise the first sale doctrine as a defense.
207
The first sale doctrine of today, as embodied in sections 109, 202, and
204(a) of the 1976 Act, should solve most of the problems that existed
with the doctrine under prior law. Once title20 to a copy of a protected
motion picture is transferred, the owner of that copy will have the right to
dispose of it in any fashion, including rental, transfer of ownership, or
destruction. 2' The owner will also be able to display the copy under
certain circumstances. 10 On the other hand, because the copyright owner
205. See, e.g., 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 79; 1975 Senate Report, supra note
20, at 71.
206. 400 F. Supp. 928, 933 (S.D. Ala. 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-3581 (5th Cir.
1976).
207. See, e.g., Avco Embassy Pictures Corp. v. Korshnak, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303
(M.D. Pa. 1974); Walt Disney Prods. v. Brown, No. IP 76-167-C (S.D. Ind., filed March
23, 1976); American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Cylinder, No. 76-724 (E.D. Pa., filed March 18,
1976). In criminal cases under the 1909 Act the Ninth Circuit appears to have taken a
contrary position. United States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977).
208. Section 27 of the 1909 Act referred to "possession" of a copy as triggering the first
sale doctrine, but courts uniformly held that-transfer of title was needed. See, e.g., Platt &
Munk & Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963); Platt & Munk & Co.
v. Playmore, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The 1976 Act makes plain that title
must be conveyed in order for § 109 to become operative. 1976 Act § 109(c); 1976 House
Report, supra note 20, at 80; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 72-73.
209. 1976 Act § 109(a). With regard to the particular copy conveyed, the right of public
distribution is for all practical purposes conveyed to the purchaser. One interesting
sentence in both the House and Senate Reports states, in essence, that even though no
public distribution or display restrictions may be imposed by reason of the copyright law,
there may be a possibility of enforcing such restrictions by means of contract law. 1976
House Report, supra note 20, at 79; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 72. Whether
this sentence would, however, have enough force to overrule a case such as Bobbs-Merrill
Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) is uncertain.
210. 1976 Act § 109(b).
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will have been presumed under section 202 to have reserved all rights
other than the right to transfer and display a particular copy, the owner of
a copy of a protected motion picture will (in the absence of a separate
transfer of the rights) be unable to reproduce the work, to prepare
derivative works based on it, to perform it publicly or to import it. 211 As
an example, the purchaser of a legitimate 8mm print containing an
excerpt of a copyrighted motion picture would have the right to resell that
print, but'he would not be able to exhibit the print publicly, whether the
exhibition took place in a theater or in a pizza parlor.212 This is, of
course, consistent with the Hampton 13 case, decided under the prior
law.
Congress, recognizing that it is unreasonable to place on copyright
owners the burden of proving that a particular copy of a motion picture
has not been sold, has specifically overruled the trial court's decision in
the Foreman21 4 case in its enactment of section 109 of the 1976 Act. The
House Report stated as follows:
During the course of its deliberations on [section 109], the Com-
mittee's attention was directed to a recent court decision holding
that the plaintiff in an infringement action had the burden of estab-
lishing that the allegedly infringing copies in the defendant's posses-
sion were not lawfully made or acquired under Section 27 of the
[1909 Act]. American International Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman ....
The Committee believes that the court's decision, if followed, would
place a virtually impossible burden on copyright owners. The deci-
sion is also inconsistent with the established legal principle that the
burden of proof should not be placed upon a litigant to establish
facts particularly within the knowledge of his adversary. . . . It is
the intent of the Committee, therefore, that in an action to determine
whether a defendant is entitled to the privilege established by Sec-
tion 109(a) and (b), the burden of proving whether a particular copy
was lawfully made or acquired should rest on the defendant.
215
211. Id. §§ 106(1), (2), (4), 602. To come within § 109(a) and (b) the copy of the
copyrighted motion pictures must have been "lawfully made," thus excluding pirated
copies of motion pictures from its coverage. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 79;
1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 72.
212. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 79; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 72,
The rental of such a legitimately acquired copy for public exhibition would also constitute
an infringement of the public performance right. See COPYRIGHT LAW REviSiON Pt. 6,
supra note 20, at 16.
213. 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960).
214. 400 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ala. 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-3581 (5th Cir. 1976).
215. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 80-81.
j
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Hence, at least in actions for infringements occurring after January 1,
1978,216 the defendant who raises the first sale doctrine defense must
prove that he lawfully acquired or made the copy involved in the suit.
This statement of congressional intent clearly puts film pirates on notice
that cases such as Foreman now offer them no hope of avoiding the legal
consequences of their activities.
Finally, it should be noted that section 109 does not distinguish
between civil and criminal cases, and presumably the burden of proof on
the first sale doctrine will be the same whether raised in either type of
action.
XI. RECORDATION OF AGREEMENTS
Recordation of documents at the Copyright Office, at least ones
involving grants of exclusive rights, is much more critical under the 1976
Act than under the prior statute. Technically, only assignments came
within the scope of the section 30 recordation provisions of the 1909
Act.217 Although transfers of less than the entire bundle of rights" 8 were,
in fact, generally afforded the benefits of the bona fide purchaser provi-
sion,219 one could never be certain of that result. Under sections 205(a)
and (b) of the new law, the Copyright Office is required to record any
document pertaining to a copyright, including transfers of less than the
total bundle of rights granted by the statute;220 and, assuming all other
216. 1976 Act, Transitional and Supplementary Provisions § 112 (to be codified at 17
U.S.C. § 501 note).
217. Section 30 read, in relevant part, as follows: "Every assignment of copyright shall
be recorded in the copyright office. . . in default of which it shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, whose
assignment has been duly recorded." 1909 Act § 30 (emphasis added).
218. As a general rule, under the so-called indivisibility doctrine, transfers of the total
bundle of rights under the 1909 Act were considered "assignments," while those that
conveyed less than the total were considered "licenses." See A. KAMENSTEIN, 86TH
CONG., IST SESS., STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY PURSUANT TO S. RES. 53,
DIVISIBILITY OF COPYRIGHT STUDY No. 11 (Comm. Print 1960). There were, nevertheless,
court-made exceptions to this rule, which made it difficult to predict how or whether the
rule would be followed. E.g., Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 401-
02 (2d Cir. 1970).
219. In practice, the Copyright Office did record documents other than assignments. 37
C.F.R. § 201.4 (1977); COMPENDIUM, supra note 9, § 12.1.2.11. The courts did grant certain
of those documents assignment status under § 30. Vidor v. Serlin, 199 N.Y.S.2d 669 (N.Y.
1960) (license of motion picture rights considered an assignment for purposes of the
recording provision); accord, Photo Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film
Corp., 213 F. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), aff'd, 220 F. 448 (2d Cir. 1915).
220. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 128; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
112. This is consistent with the fact that the indivisibility doctrine under the prior statute
has been abandoned in the new law. 1976 Act § 201(d)(2).
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conditions are met, bona fide purchaser benefits attach to such recorded
documents.221
The new bona fide purchaser subsection differs somewhat from its
counterpart in the 1909 Act. The grace period for recording has been
shortened in the 1976 Act from three months to one month in the case of
domestically executed documents and from six months to two months for
documents executed outside the United States.222 As under the 1909
Act, 223 after the grace period has lapsed innocent purchasers of exclusive
rights must be the first to record in a race to the Copyright Office to
obtain the statute's benefits.
224
A new element of the bona fide purchaser provision is that even if a
transfer of rights has been recorded, registration for the work involved
must be made in order to charge an innocent purchaser with constructive
notice of that transfer. 225 An innocent subsequent purchaser of exclusive
rights to an unregistered work may be able to gain a priority if he records
his grant and registers the work first. For motion picture producers, this
is especially important in the area of purchase agreements involving
stories to be made into motion pictures. Because the 1976 Act covers
published stories,226 plus certain stories not previously protected under
the 1909 Act,227 consideration should be given to recording all story
purchase agreements consummated after January 1, 1978, as well as
those entered into before that date. Moreover, registration for such
stories should be made.228
A correlative question arises as to whether story purchase agreements
recorded at the Copyright Office prior to January 1, 1978 are afforded
constructive notice under the 1976 Act. Any such recorded document
concerning a work for which copyright was secured under the 1909 Act
will clearly satisfy the provisions of section 205(c) of the new law, even
without a registration for the work. 229 However, if the recorded document
221. 1976 Act § 205(c).
222. Id. § 205(e).
223. 1909 Act § 30. See A. LATMAN, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDIES PREPARED FOR
THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY PURSUANT TO S. RES. 53, THE RECORDATION OF COPYRIGHT ASSIGNMENTS
AND LICENSES STUDY No. 19 (Comm. Print 1960).
224. 1976 Act § 205(e).
225. Id. § 205(c)(2).
226. Id. § 301(a).
227. See notes 42 & 182 supra.
228. See text accompanying notes 161-66 supra, discussing registration under the new
Act.
229. 1976 Act, Transitional and Supplementary Provisions § 109 (to be codified at 17
U.S.C. § 301). Documents not attaining the status of "assignments" should still be given
the benefit of constructive notice. See note 219 supra.
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relates to a work not protected under the 1909 law, would constructive
notice be given to the transfer once registration for the work was obtained
under the 1976 Act? In the author's opinion, such documents will
probably not be accorded the constructive notice benefit because both
Congressional Reports to the Act contain the following language in
discussing section 109 of the Transitional and Supplementary Provisions:
Several provisions of the bill including Section 205(c)(2), 205(d)...
prescribe . . . recordation as a prerequisite for certain purposes.
Where the work involved is covered by a subsisting copyright when
the new law becomes effective, it is intended that any. . . recorda-
tion made under the [1909 Act] would satisfy these provisions.230
This explanatory language relates only to works protected under the 1909
Act, which excludes from its coverage most unpublished works.
231
Documents not related to works protected under the 1909 Act but
nevertheless recorded at the Copyright Office prior to January 1, 1978
should be recorded again under the 1976 Act. Once registration under the
1976 Act is made for the works referred to in those documents, construc-
tive notice will attach to the recorded agreements.
A practice in the motion picture industry has for years been to record
not the complete document evidencing a transfer of rights, but rather, a
so-called "short form assignment," which is often just a compilation of
the grant clauses (plus other miscellaneous clauses) from the more
complete document. The reason for recording this shorter document is
that the short form assignment does not disclose to the public the
financial terms of the transfer. This practice is still justifiable under the
1976 Act, as section 205(c) affords constructive notice of all the facts
stated in the recorded document, which in the case of a short form
assignment would include all of the necessary facts to protect the produc-
er from a subsequent purchaser.
232 '
Motion picture producers should take heed of another important recor-
dation provision embodied in section 205(f) of the new Act. An unre-
corded and prior nonexclusive license (for example, a nonexclusive grant
of motion picture rights to a story) will have priority over a later but
exclusive transfer, even though the exclusive agreement was recorded at
the Copyright Office before the nonexclusive one. This provision was
adopted despite strenuous efforts on the part of the motion picture
230. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 181-82; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20,
at 160-61 (emphasis added).
231. See notes 42 & 182 supra.
232. See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 3, supra note 49, at 304.
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industry to persuade Congress that such a provision would cause them
serious difficulties. The Congress nonetheless decided that such argu-
ments were outweighed by other factors.233
XII. REMEDIES
A. Civil
After registration, the legal or beneficial owner of any of the exclusive
rights granted by the 1976 Act may bring an action for infringement of
those rights.2 34 For instance, an exhibitor of a copyrighted motion pic-
ture, if he acquired the exclusive right to perform that picture within a
certain area, would be entitled to bring an action for the exhibition of that
film within his exclusive territory. In those circumstances, in order for
the first exhibitor to have standing to sue the second exhibitor, registra-
tion for the motion picture would have to have been made, and most
importantly, the agreement granting him exclusive public performance
rights would have to have been recorded at the Copyright Office. 235 Of
course, a producer or exhibitor may avoid such litigious conflicts by
making his exhibition agreements nonexclusive or by providing for the
complete control of infringement actions relating to the exclusive rights
granted in his exhibition agreements.
The owner of exclusive rights to a motion picture continues to have
available to him the injunction and the writ of seizure remedies that were
provided under the 1909 Act. 36 Moreover, it appears from the legislative
history of section 503 that the Supreme Court rules on the writ of seizure
will remain viable. 237 By such a writ a court can order the seizure and
impoundment (during the pendency of the trial) of infringing copies of a
motion picture and the apparatus used to produce the infringing copies. 238
Additionally, under the 1976 Act a court may order the impoundment of
non-infringing (that is, legitimately made) copies of motion pictures that
233. Congress felt that the impracticalities and burdens associated with recordation of
nonexclusive licenses outweighed the limited advantages of their mandatory recordation.
See 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 129; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 112.
234. 1976 Act § 501(a), (b). The term "beneficial owner" is not defined in the statute.
An example of such an owner, however, is an author who has parted with legal title to the
copyright to his work in exchange for royalty percentages. 1976 House Report, supra note
20, at 159; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 141.
235. 1976 Act §8 501(b), 411, 205(d). Under § 501(b), the basic copyright owner of the
motion picture would also have to be notified of the pending action.
236. Compare 1976 Act 88 502, 503(a) with 1909 Act § 101(a), (c).
237. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 160; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
152.
238. Sup. CT. RULES OF PRACTICE: INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS 3-13.
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were used in violation of section 501 239 This may go farther than prior
law.
Under the new law, after trial a court may still order the destruction or
other reasonable disposition of the infringing copies or legitimate copies
used in an infringing way and the apparatus used to reproduce the
infringing copies.240
Perhaps the most dramatic changes in civil remedies from prior law
concern actual damages, profits and statutory damages. The damages
section of the 1909 Act had been a nightmare to apply. Its peculiar
language forced courts to come to diverse interpretations. 241 One unique
problem related to motion pictures was the uncertainty of the statutory
damages that would accrue in the case of multiple unauthorized exhibi-
tions of a film. 242
The new law resolves many of these uncertainties, while retaining the
remedy of actual damages for injuries caused by an infringement.243
Furthermore, to the extent they are not actual damages, the infringer is
liable for the profits resulting from the infringing activities. 244 Like prior
law, the copyright owner need only present evidence proving the gross
revenues of the infringer. It is then the burden of the infringer to show his
deductible expenses and his profits from other activities.
245
As a practical matter, it is often difficult if not impossible to prove
actual damages in a copyright infringement case. Hence, in lieu of
proving actual damages and profits, the new law continues to provide the
copyright owner with statutory damages which he may elect to receive as
an award at any time prior to final judgment. 246 The copyright owner
cannot, however, ask for statutory damages if he also asks for profits.24 7
239. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 160; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
142-43.
240. 1976 Act § 503(b).
241. Compare, e.g., Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v. 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc., 367 F.2d
236 (9th Cir. 1966) and Sid & Marty Kroft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) with Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d
194 (2d Cir. 1964).
242. Compare Jewell-La Salle Realty Co. v. Buck, 283 U.S. 202 (1931) with Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Septum, Inc., No. C-75-1775-A (N.D. Ga., filed Nov. 19,
1976). See Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976).
243. 1976 Act § 504(a)(1).
244. Id.
245. Id. § 504(a)(1), (b); 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 161; 1975 Senate Report,
supra note 20, at 143.
246. 1976 Act § 504(a)(2), (c)(1).
247. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 161; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
143.
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This limitation was also applied by at least one circuit under the 1909
Act.248
The maximum statutory damages one can obtain in an infringement
action has generally been increased, but in one situation has actually been
reduced. The new ceiling for statutory damages is ten thousand dollars
or, if willfulness can be satisfactorily proven, fifty thousand dollars.
249
This is a change from a maximum of five thousand dollars for non-willful
infringement and no ceiling for willful infringement.250
If an individual infringes only one work a number of times (even over
a long period of time), it is clear that the copyright owner is limited to
only one award of statutory damages. 21 For example, if an infringer
acquires a legitimate print of a motion picture and publicly exhibits that
print without proper consent over a ten week period two hundred fifty
times at four of his theaters, the maximum statutory damages obtainable
under the new law could well be limited to ten thousand dollars. Under
the 1909 Act, however, one could have argued that there were possibly
up to two hundred fifty infringements (the number of performances)? 5
2
If more than one motion picture had been involved in such a hypothet-
ical infringement case, a separate statutory damages award under the
1976 Act would be possible for each movie infringed. 3 Further, if the
infringer was a distributor who licensed theaters not owned by him to
exhibit the motion picture, the distributor254 would be liable for a separate
statutory damages award for each exhibitor who was guilty of such an
infringement. 255 The number of minimum statutory damages awards a
248. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1964).
249. 1976 Act § 504(c).
250. 1909 Act § 101(b).
251. 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 162; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
144.
252. 1909 Act § 101(b); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Septum, Inc., No. C-75-
1775-A (N.D. Ga., filed Nov. 19, 1976).
253. The limiting phrase of "with respect to any one work" is used in 1976 Act §
,504(c)(1). A distinction is made between "works" and "copyrights." If only one work is
involved in an action, but many copyrights covered that single work, only one statutory
damages award can be made. See 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 162, example no.
3; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 144; accord, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 4,
supra note 49, at 136.
254. The distributor, who authorized the infringement, would be liable as a contribu-
tory or vicarious infringer. 1976 Act § 106; 1976 House Report, supra note 20, at 61, 159-
60; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 57, 141-42.
255. Each exhibitor is a separate infringer and would ordinarily be joined together only
for purposes of convenience. The court is required to grant a separate statutory damages
award for each infringer. The fact that the distributor is jointly liable with each infringing
exhibitor does not affect the necessity of making such separate awards. See 1976 House
Report, supra note 20, at 162, example nos. 2, 4; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at
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court is required to grant is equal to the product of the number of works
infringed multiplied by the number of infringers (joint infringers to be
considered as one unit) in a particular case.
Finally, it should be noted that costs and attorneys' fees are discretion-
ary with the court, the latter being recoverable only by the prevailing
party. 256
B. Criminal
The criminal penalties for an infringement of a copyright to a motion
picture have been strengthened in the new Act. For a first offense the
penalties possible are imprisonment of less than one year and a fine of no
more than ten thousand dollars. For a subsequent offense, the possible
penalties are increased to imprisonment of not more than two years and a
fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars.57 Upon conviction the court
is also required to order the forfeiture or other disposition of all infringing
copies and apparatus used in manufacturing infringing copies 358 Such
penalties have long been needed to put teeth in the criminal sanctions
against film and tape pirates.
Under section 506(a), to find a party guilty of criminal copyright
infringement it is necessary to prove willfulness and that the infringement
was for commercial advantage or private financial gain. It thus appears
that activity not considered criminal activity under the 1909 Act may rise
to criminally culpable conduct under the new Act.259
XIII. CONCLUSION
On the whole, the copyright owners of motion pictures have had the
protection of their works strengthened by the 1976 Copyright Act. The
144. A perhaps clearer explanation of what was intended by the statutory damages
provision in cases involving multiple infringements was made by the late Register of
Copyrights, Abraham Kaminstein, in his 1961 Supplementary Report. See COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION Pt. 6, supra note 20, at 136-37; accord COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION Pt. 5,
supra note 181, at 203, 269. An additional multiple could be inserted into the statutory
damages formula if a second copyright owner joined in the action. For instance, the
copyright owners of music embodied in an infringed motion picture could join in an action
against a defendant who publicly performed the picture without permission, and would be
entitled to a separate award of statutory damages.
256. 1976 Act § 505.
257. Compare 1976 Act § 506(a) with 1909 Act § 104.
258. 1976 Act § 506(b).
259. Under the 1909 Act one had to infringe willfully and "for profit." 1909 Act § 104.
The words "for commercial advantage" may be broader in scope than "for profit,"
although the Congressional Reports used the two phrases synonymously. 1976 House
Report, supra note 20, at 163; 1975 Senate Report, supra note 20, at 145.
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longer term of protection, the extension of the performance right to all
motion pictures, and the partial elimination of the renewal process are
three of the more favorable changes. The industry benefits most, how-
ever, where the new statute takes positions on various troublesome issues
that arose under the 1909 Act. The Wyatt and Foreman cases are
specifically overruled, and protection for motion pictures embodied only
on videotapes and for sound tracks is expressly confirmed. The new
limitations on the rights of motion picture copyright owners, including
the right of termination, do not present insurmountable problems. In-
deed, it will probably be the uncertainties resulting from the numerous
unintentionally ambiguous provisions of the 1976 Act that will present
the most difficulties. Undoubtedly, changes in the 1976 Act will have to
be made, as experience reveals what provisions are not workable and as
new technology is developed. Those changes should, however, turn out
to be few in number, for the 1976 Copyright Act confronts most of the
copyright problems the motion picture industry might anticipate encoun-
tering through the remainder of the twentieth century.
